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Availability is not often a primary concern for frameworks meant to provide 
security. Poly^2 is one such framework. It provides us with a hardened foundation based 
on secure design principles to run mission-critical services. While, the primary focus of 
Poly^2 till now seems to have been fault isolation, we will now attempt to add recovery 
as well. However, current techniques may compromise the security principles on which 
the framework was originally built. We propose a hybrid system based on two popular 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Poly^2 (short for poly-computer poly-network) paradigm  (Bryant et 
al., 2003) posited a hardened framework in which the critical network services of 
an organization can operate.  This framework was intended to provide robust 
protection against the attacks running within this domain.  As a part of this 
approach, network services are separated.  They are placed in application-
specific systems and use minimized operating systems. This allows the isolation 
of untrusted systems and services. This also prevents vulnerabilities in one 
system from affecting other systems.  The core design problems were inspired by 
Saltzer and Schroeder principles (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975) and Neuman’s 
principles (Neumann, 2000).  
 While the paradigm looks at securing the system and from containing any 
unwanted breaches, it however leaves the issue of availability open. The setup 
inspired by the Poly^2 ensures security and isolation of services to prevent the 
repercussions of breaches from spreading beyond the affected service. 
Availability has been defined in Bryant et al. (2003) as systems that are 






The challenge with working on availability in this system is that the 
security aspect of the paradigm will have to be kept at the forefront. This, of 
course, would mean that a definition of availability has to be adopted that would 
fit into this paradigm, which is why the above definition may seem inadequate. 
 The notion of availability has been borrowed from the telecommunications 
industry and the definitions also seem to have followed those norms. These 
norms have laid more stress on fault tolerance due to it’s inherent understanding 
in the matter of telecommunications. By this, availability as defined by the 
Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions Telecom Glossary (2007) is 
“The ratio of (a) the total time a functional unit is capable of being used during a 
given interval to (b) the length of the interval”.  In Ross (1997), availability is 
given as the probability that a system is functioning at time t.  In Laprie (1992), 
availability is given as readiness for correct service.  
 However, all the above definitions relate to dependability only. Availability 
is very closely related to security as security breaches have often led to 
availability failures, examples of this being denial of service attacks, which often 
lead to the service being unavailable. From a perspective of security, the 
International Standards Organization (2000) defines availability as “Ensuring that 
authorized users have access to information and associated assets when 
required”. However, as is asserted in Rosseba et al. (2006), availability has to be 
a consensus between dependability, security and usability. Therefore, the 
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definition that is given in International Standards Organization (1989) and the 
International Standards Organization (2001) seems the most suited. 
 Hence, the above definition that says, “Availability is the property of being 
accessible and usable on demand by an authorized entity” will be adopted for the 
purpose of this study.  With this definition in mind, the research question will be 
stated. 
1.2. Research Question 
 
How can services under the Poly^2 framework be made accessible and 
usable on demand by an authorized entity through fault tolerance mechanisms? 
What would be the costs involved in such a feature and how would they be 
comparable to the alternatives? 
1.3. Scope 
 
 There would be certain constraints that would be placed upon the 
problem. The study would be attempting to provide fault tolerance within the 
context of the framework. However, there may be an issue where a better 
availability solution may have to be compromised to stay within the original 
principles of the framework. 
The scope of the problem is limited to fault recovery. As a result, the 
researcher would be studied implementation of fault tolerance techniques in the 
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context of providing secure services. However, Fault correction or prevention of 
vulnerabilities are beyond the scope. When a service has been compromised, 
the exact same service can be restored from a backup replica. This could 




 The question of availability arises when the system is required to be 
continuously operational for long periods of time. The Poly^2 framework is meant 
to contain within itself the services that are mission critical to an organization 
(Bryant et al., 2003). Due to this nature of framework, it is necessary that proper 
measures be taken to ensure the protection and continuation of these services.  
 With the changing focus of security research, aspects other than security 
are now also seen to be addressed (Meadows, 1994). Due to the prevalence of 
denial-of-service attacks, it has become more important to address the issues of 
availability in secure systems as well. Access control lists can be seen to address 
the issues but unfortunately while they can prevent other processes from denying 
the service access to resources, they cannot guarantee the actual provision of 
the service.   
It has been acknowledged in Kyamakya, et al. (2000) that totally secure 
systems are not practical and that measures need to be taken to ensure that the 
flow of services and information is uninterrupted. It has been mentioned that the 
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system requirements need the essential and non-essential services to be 
separated. The essential or mission critical services need to be made accessible 
and usable by authorized entities. 
The issue of integrating the paradigms of security and fault tolerance has 
been explored as a part of the literature review. However, this issue is seen in 
the real world as two separate ones.  But ensuring that secured services remain 
accessible and usable is necessary for the organization to function since 
businesses are becoming more and more dependant on computers and 
computer networks.  These services although often protected may still remain 
vulnerable to faults such as hardware failure, excessive load, etc. Added to this, 
it also remains that all possible exploits cannot be accounted for within these 
services. It has to be ensured that these services are available in the presence of 
any possible faults (malicious or otherwise). While stopping them may involve 
techniques that could be more expensive, the Poly^2 approach has been the 
isolation and absorption of these faults, the colloquial “rolling with the punches”. 
This is what makes the issue of providing this aspect of availability within Poly^2 
significant.      
However, there are a number of approaches to providing reliability aspects 
to the Poly^2 framework. We will be using the cost-benefit analysis based 
approaches to look at the technique proposed by the author vis-à-vis the existing 






 The following were the limitations under which the research was carried 
out: 
• While this study is to determine availability techniques for  secure 
network frameworks, the researcher will be focusing on the Poly^2 
framework. 
• For the cost-benefit analysis, the researcher will be focusing on 
replication-based techniques. 
• For the purpose of the implementation, the hardware of implementation 




The following would be the delimitations under which the research would 
be carried out: 
• For the purposes of the project, the replicas will also have the same 
vulnerabilities as the original services. 
• The standing of the cost-benefit analysis is restricted to the service 
providers.  
• The cost-benefit analysis will be limited in its extent on the cost to 
the Poly^2 framework. 
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• The cost and the benefits would be applicable to the service 
providers whose services would be falling under the purview of 
Poly^2. 
1.7. Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter introduced the research the research being carried out for the 
thesis. Also explored was the significance of the research as well as the 
constraints within which it is being carried out.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
There are primarily four components to a system providing availability – 
fault detection, fault-tolerance, fault-recovery and fault prevention. The 
researcher’s concerns are limited to fault-tolerance. This chapter will begin by  
looking at existing literature in fault-detection since to be able to be tolerant to 
faults, it is essential that they be detected first. It will then be looking at various 
techniques for providing availability through replication and other techniques. 
This section will be concluding with techniques that would harmonize both 
availability and security. 
2.1. Fault Detection 
 
For failure detection, absence of proof of aliveness would be taken as 
evidence of the same.  Heartbeat messages provide perfect failure detection  
(Anderson & Lee, 1982). They are exchanged between replicas during error-free 
periods to keep a mutual track of redundant systems within the infrastructure. 
Four accelerated heartbeat protocols were suggested to be used between 
replicas (Gouda & McGuire, 1998).  These protocols were based on the 
principles of low beat rate, low detection delay and low probability of premature 
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termination. Low beat rate is the rate at which the beat messages are sent, the 
detection delay is the longest period that can be allowed to pass after one 
process terminates and the probability of premature termination is the probability 
that the heartbeat protocol declares termination due to the loss of a beat 
message. These were with the purpose of reducing overhead and increasing the 
responsiveness and reliability of the protocol, respectively. The first one is a 
binary protocol involving only two processes, the next one is a static one with n 
processes, and the third and the fourth protocols start with one process and 
gradually expand to include more. The first three are static in the matter that they 
do not allow members to leave (the first two do not allow members to enter 
either). The fourth one allows members to leave the heartbeat network as well. 
Later, a multi-level heartbeat protocol architecture is provided that is primarily to 
prevent single points of failure (Li et al., 2009).  Heartbeat protocols are primarily 
deployed as processes on the application layer. This brings up the restrictions of 
the scheduler on the protocol that might result in the protocol being inadvertently 
compromised. It was proposed to integrate the protocol with the network layer 
(Wang & Li, 2008). This technique let the protocol run directly from the kernel. 
However, it required that a separate network interface be used that would require 
major changes in infrastructure. 
Often, perfect failures (which are detected by the heartbeat protocol) may 
need to be need to be achieved in cases such as network breaches where failure 
is not evident but may need to be declared to prevent further damage and to let 
recovery take place. For this purpose, watchdog timers or a STONITH like 
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approach, which uses a network power switch to reboot the service, may be 
used. STONITH means “Shoot The Other Node In The Head”.  
2.2. Replication 
 
Due to the presence of single services running on each of the nodes on 
the application nodes, a replication approach may be seen as a way towards 
achieving availability.  The semi-active replication (also known as leader/follower) 
approach (Schmidt & O’Ryan, 2000) is one in which each non-deterministic 
action is carried out in the replicas and then the leader notifies them that it has 
been successfully carried out to keep the states consistent. This approach seems 
to have limited applications. It requires that the files remain read-only.  Due to 
large volumes of data transfer, this approach may seem unsuitable for services 
requiring high throughput. In the work by Deplance et al. (1999), a semi-active 
replication strategy is implemented on the Chorus/ClassiX distributed operating 
system. The main features of this system were that the management of the 
replicas was transparent to the application designer and the application designer 
had only to describe the distribution and replication of actors. 
Active replication on the other hand has all nodes concurrently process 
the incoming traffic (Wang et al., 2001) with the clients seeing only one server 
that is responding. There are two approaches to implementing this. The first one 
is that all the nodes use reliable multicast protocols to deliver the traffic to them 
such as those proposed in Deering (1989). This technique, however, requires 
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that both the client and the server are reliable multi-cast aware i.e. they are able 
to use Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for atomic 
broadcasts/multicasts. Another way as proposed in Ayari  et al. (2008a) and 
Ayari et al. (2008b) is to provide a proxy or gateway as an intermediary to deliver 
the messages to all the replicas. This may lead to higher processing overheads 
and possible changes in the hardware architecture. Moreover, it ends up adding 
another single point of failure. If either the proxy or gateway were to fail, it would 
lead a nullification of the replication scheme.  Architectural modification may also 
be needed to accommodate the additional intermediary. Also, another suggested 
technique of active state replication reduces the dependence on a single point of 
failure. This involves the replicas passively intercepting and processing the traffic 
offered to the primary server. However, only the primary server responds to the 
traffic. This approach requires that the replicas be equivalent to the primary 
server in regard to hardware and software capabilities. This seems suited to the 
Poly^2 architecture where the replicas of the individual service servers would be 
ones which would have exactly the same hardware and configurations. However, 
this approach might lead to a breach of security. Because the primary server’s 
state is replicated on all the replicas, a breach would also be replicated leading 
possibly to recovery not occurring and hence defeating the whole purpose of 
replication. In Engelmann (2007), approaches of replication to High-Performance 
Computing (HPC) are described. An attempt is made to provide a generic 
programming interface to create replication environments for different services 
rather than building them from ground up. They provide three distinct models for 
  
12 
replication. An Active/Standby model is one in which there is one active service 
and atleast one standby service that operates either in warm or hot standby 
mode. An asymmetric active/active model is one in which there are two or more 
active services, each of which operates independently and share no state, 
however they do have their own standby services sharing states with the either of 
the active services. A symmetric active/active model is one in which there are 
two or more active services which have the same capabilities and share the 
same global state. 
2.3. Other Availability Techniques 
 
A checkpointing approach (Laadan et al., 2005) can be seen as a passive 
replication technique. The server state is periodically copied to a standby server 
and restored from the checkpoints during failures. This approach works at the 
transport layer in a protocol independent manner. This approach decouples the 
operating system from distributed application. The application itself is run on a 
virtualization layer. This allows the checkpointing application to simultaneously 
and smoothly checkpoint the distributed application. The main problems seem to 
be lack of perennial consistency between the primary servers and the replicas 
and the significant overheads that may be incurred when creating the checkpoint. 
From a security perspective, however, this approach may allow a fallback to a 
point where the system was not compromised. 
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In Bhide (1992), availability schemes are discussed with two very distinct 
scenarios. One is with a Shared Nothing Database with Asynchronous Replica 
Management and the other is with a Network File System. In these schemes, 
Bhide discusses a basic asynchronous replication technique on which both the 
replication methods are based. All the transactions are carried out on the primary 
entity and the transactions are located on a log that is often kept in a separate 
domain to protect it from failure. The log is used to run the transactions on 
replicas. This update can be done either upon failure or be carried out regularly. 
This is seen to require large amounts of network bandwidth but is efficient in 
terms CPU and I/O required. With the NFS, there are two layers of replication 
that are carried out. One is at disk level and the other is at server-level. Each 
server services two similar disks on which the data is replicated so in case of disk 
failure on one of the disks, the other disk can maintain the data. With the servers, 
in case of failure, the replica server can obtain the current “duplication cache” 
from one of the disks and carry on the service keeping the failure and recovery 
transparent to the users. However, in this case the protocol itself is stateless and 
the effects of this technique with stateful protocols are yet to be seen. In case of 
the asynchronous replica management, the transaction state is used to maintain 
the replicas. All changes are recorded onto a log and in the event of a failure, the 
replica fetches this log and updates it’s state to the primary server’s point of 
failure. 
 All these techniques, however, give security a secondary consideration. 
They do form the basis and are also the most commonly used techniques used 
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to provide availability. We will now look at some of the existing work at 
harmonizing fault tolerance and security. 
2.4. Security and Fault Tolerance 
 
 
In Meadows (1995), it is argued that the current security paradigm is a 
subset of the types of approaches used in dependability. This is to move away 
from the currently used approach of a worst case scenario. Instead in Meadows 
(1994), it is suggested moving towards a failure model. Among the approaches 
missed, is the particular one of fault tolerance. Though Meadows argues that 
fault tolerance principles have been subconsciously used in security paradigms 
such as operating systems that have multilevel security to keep possibly 
malicious code in the untrusted portion of the system. Taking this view, Meadows 
builds a fault model for security based on the three areas of faults in security 
mechanisms, hostile attacks on the system and compromises due to poor usage 
of the security mechanisms. However, we shall be taking an approach which 
goes in the opposite direction in which Meadows has been pointing. Instead of 
fashioning the security paradigm around the dependability paradigm, we will be 
attempting to fashion fault tolerance around the security paradigm.  
In Price (2001), the author attempts to provide fault tolerance to security 
protocols. For this purpose, he redefines failure in case of protocols to say that it 
occurs when the goals of the protocol specification are not met. He gave a fault 
tolerance mechanism based on anonymity to provide security against denial of 
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service attacks. Next, he attempted to show the effect of state on fault tolerance 
in secure services. He gave, on the basis of statelessness, two notions of 
replication for secure services. A stateless server involves complete 
independence between the replicas to prevent a malicious server from exposing 
the rest of the replication group. However, this form of disconnection is not 
feasible for providing availability. A semi-stateless server, on the other hand 
shares a limited set of information with other servers within the group. This allows 
a form of limited replication that can be controlled through the security policy. 
This also prevents the malicious server from exposing the group completely. This 
technique is one that can be easily integrated into a hardened framework where 
security policy on the rest of the network is determined. However, unlike stateful 
replication, this may lead to loss of functionality and may defeat the very purpose 
of replication if the security policy is not configured properly. 
In Malkhi and Reiter (1998), a secure replication technique is suggested 
based on a quorum. In this case, there are a large number of servers and the 
operations are carried out on a quorum of the same. i.e. if there are a total of n 
servers, the operations are based on the responses from a quorum which is 
typically !n. This allows the systems to tolerate a wide range of failures. This was 
primarily meant to service applications such as Public Key infrastructures, 
Publishing and dissemination and National Voting Systems.  
In Cachin and Poritz (2002), a replication technique that maybe tolerant to 
intrusions is suggested. It involves using a cryptographic channel for the purpose 
of atomic broadcasts in order to securely maintain the causality of the system. It 
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is built upon multiple layers of cryptographic primitives and binary agreements 
upon which the replication is carried out. The atomic broadcast itself is 
considered a channel for the purposes of this system through which a secure 
fault tolerance system is built.  
In Schneider and Zhou (2005), a form of distributed trust is posited. This 
involves basing the fault tolerance on the distributed trust. This way, if a single or 
a small number of components are disabled or compromised, the ensemble of 
state machines would still outvote their actions. The approach suggested here 
however does tend to go against traditional replication paradigms. There 
suggestions are to use multiple server configurations that may not necessarily 
have common software. While, this approach will prevent vulnerabilities from 
being replicated. It will also create issues with coordination of replicas. 
In Reiter (1995), a toolkit is provided to attempt to provide a replication 
solution to security-critical services. Called Rampart, it attempts to provide 
correct and reliable replication service inspite of malicious intent of attackers 
attempting to enter the system. This toolkit takes the approach of relieving the 
developer of issues regarding replication and takes care of the aspect. The 
primary components of the toolkit are the secure atomic multicast, reliable 
multicast and the group membership protocol. Cryptographic attributes were 





2.5. Looking at Cost Benefit Analysis Techniques 
 
Cost benefit analysis is used to allocate resources more efficiently to 
certain projects. Cost benefit analysis are performed either during the course of 
the project, known as media res; while the project is being considered, known as 
ex ante; or at the end of the project, also known as ex post (Boardman et al, 
2006).  Cost Benefit analysis is often used to show the superiority of a project 
with respect to alternatives. 
In Boardman et al, (2006), a fundamental approach to cost benefit 
analysis is examined. It starts with the very basic process of identifying the set of 
alternative projects that may be used instead of the one under consideration. 
Next, the actor who plays the principal role in the project is identified. This actor 
is said to have standing, i.e. it is their costs and benefits that are being studied. 
Next the impact of the project alternatives is studied as benefits or costs. Along 
with this, the measurement criterion is also specified. Next the impact of the 
project is specified over its lifetime. This impact is monetized and the net value of 
the project is discovered.  
The above method deals on a generic level of cost-benefit analysis with 
non-information technology projects as well. However, in cost-benefit analysis of 
IT products, it is often difficult to evaluate the benefits (Sassone, 1998). There 
are some methodologies that are discussed to carry out cost benefit analysis on 
Information Technology products.  Decision Analysis provides an operations 
research perspective to making choices. It is particularly useful for evaluating 
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systems meant to support routine decision making. A structural model represents 
a line of business or function and the impact of the information system on the 
costs and benefits of the function.  A breakeven analysis is carried out by 
parametrizing the benefits obtained. This is often carried out when the benefits 
cannot be quantified. Subjective analysis is carried out again when the benefits 
are intangible, speculative or uncertain. It is often carried out in response to a 
fixed cost.  
However, for information security projects a different approach to cost 
benefit analysis is required. The benefits are often tied directly to the costs 
making cutting costs an important benefit (Gordon and Loeb, 2005).The 
magnitude of cybersecurity breaches often defines the cost and whether it is 
direct or indirect cost or whether it is implicit or explicit. The goal with 
implementing any project has to be the maximization of benefits with respect to 
the costs.  
The benefits with respect to cybersecurity are often cost avoidance; i.e. 
avoiding the costs that occur due to cybersecurity breaches. There are a number 
of models that can be associated with the treatment of cost avoidance as 
possible benefits in cybersecurity. Often, it is required that the anticipated 
benefits be compared to costs over time. A model that is associated with such an 
approach is the net present value (NPV) model.  NPV refers to the difference 
between the present cost of the project and its initial cost. This approach is useful 
in considering incremental investment to cybersecurity. A positive NPV leads to 
an acceptance of the measures, while a negative or zero NPV leads to rejection 
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or indifference.  The NPV shows how much the anticipated benefits would 
exceed the present value of the anticipated costs. The internal rate of return 
(IRR) model is a derivative of the NPV model. Instead of dealing with present 
value, it uses the average cost of capital as a metric. The cost of capital is the 
minimum rate a project needs to earn in order to keep the organization’s value 
from reducing. The IRR is the discount that makes the NPV equal to zero. An 
IRR greater than the average cost of capital leads to an acceptance of the 
measures, while lesser or equal IRR would lead to rejection or indifference.  
The above, however, have dealt with how to carry out a cost-benefit 
analysis. Wei et al (2001) carry out the cost-benefit analysis of installing a 
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS).  They use the Annual Loss 
Expectancy (ALE) as their metric to determine the cost involved. ALE here refers 
to the product of the number of incidents with the total number of incidents that 
have occurred. They use a cost model based on operating costs, damage costs 
and response costs where operating costs are the costs involved in analyzing the 
stream of traffic, the response costs involve the costs of responding to the 
intrusion while the damage costs involve the costs that might be incurred if the 
intrusion is successful.  The cost benefit is carried out based on the cost incurred 







2.6. Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the various fault detection techniques, replication 
methods and other availability models in the course of this chapter. It then looked 
at the various attempts that have been made at marrying the concepts of security 
and fault tolerance. To get an indication of the benefits accrued due to the 
project, a cost benefit analysis is carried out. This chapter looked at some 
approaches that have been explored in the cybersecurity domain.  Keeping these 
in mind, the approach towards implementing availability within the Poly^2 
framework will now be looked at. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Implementation 
 
There would be two aspects of looking at the problem. One would be an 
analysis of the costs associated with implementation of the aspect. The second 
would be the implementation itself. 
The research focuses on carrying out a study of high availability 
techniques. For the analysis, a cost-benefit analysis of the techniques we have 
suggested with respect to the Poly^2 system was carried out. This analysis took 
into account changes to software, hardware, configuration as well as 
architectural changes. Potential benefits will be including fault tolerant 
characteristics in the Poly^2 framework. The Poly^2 framework is based on 
secure design principles. As a part of the analysis, it has to be taken into account 
as well as how much would these design principles be affected. Upon the 
completion of the analysis, the most viable of the techniques will be 
implemented. 
The nodes of the Poly^2 framework are single service servers. Each of 
them has customized operating systems and minimized network stacks. The 
operating system is tuned to support a single, specific application. This tuning is 
carried out primarily in terms of performance and security. This specialization 
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allows detection of deviations from normal behavior. With respect to the analysis, 
it has to be seen as to how these techniques will affect this configuration and to 
what extent.  
The researcher has two possible approaches to the problem posited. He 
can either adopt an active replication technique, a checkpointing approach or a 
hybrid of both. An active replication technique would seem suited to the purpose 
due the lack of service consolidation and the presence of a gateway within the 
framework that would simplify the use of one-to-many multicast. However, with 
active replication, malicious states might be replicated as well. Vulnerabilities and 
breaches that had been found in the primary node would be replicated in the 
replica as well which would not serve our purpose.  
The checkpointing approach combined with an Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) may solve the above condition. If on detecting an intrusion or attack 
through the IDS and failure of the node, the last checkpoint before the intrusion 
may be restored. However, this approach may slow down legitimate faults that 
occur through other means. 
To detect failure in the nodes, a heartbeat protocol may be used. A 
heartbeat protocol is already in place between the Poly^2 gateways and a 
protocol based on the work of (Li et al., 2009) may be implemented with the 
gateways as the control nodes.     
The researcher expects a hybrid active replication-checkpointing approach 
as a way towards solving our research question. As a part of this, it is expected 
to make this feature a part of the Poly^2 framework. 
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3.2. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
The cost-benefit analysis of the project was carried out based on the 
benefits with respect to the alternatives available. We would be looking at active 
replication and checkpointing as alternatives since they are the ones most 
popular in usage today. Our costs would be based on the impact on the original 
design of the Poly^2 framework, the engineering resources which would be 
involved and the software engineering effort which would be involved. Our 
benefits would be in terms of decrease in downtime and the effectiveness of the 
recovery that can be initiated.  
With respect to the monetary costs regarding the costs as well as benefits 
with respect to the projects analyzed, costs are recorded on a per incident basis 
leading to an average dollar value (Gordon et al, 2005). However, the Poly^2 
framework is yet to be implemented commercially giving it a unique perspective. 
Due to it’s current prototype status and lack of public deployment, obtaining 
precise values for dollar costs would be beyond the scope, hence the analysis 
would be restricted to non-monetary costs.  The analysis restricts itself to the first 
order effects of the costs as well as the benefits. That is, we consider the effects 
only on the actors who would be affected through direct loss of business, 
availability and reputation if the service became unavailable.    
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CHAPTER 4. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
As we have mentioned before, for the purpose of our cost benefit analysis 
we will be looking at cost benefit analysis of the project through two aspects. 
First, we will be looking at the alternatives. These include two recovery 
paradigms, one is based on the active state replication paradigm and the other is 
based on a checkpointing paradigm. Second, we will be looking at the alternative 
suggested as a part of this project and comparing it to the other two alternatives. 
This analysis was carried out in the media res form. In this case, i.e.  it was 
carried out in the duration of the project. 
4.1. Analysis of the Active State Replication Paradigm 
 
The active state replication paradigm relies on a single primary server and 
multiple replicas of the server. Under normal functioning, the state of the primary 
service is replicated across the replicas. Whenever the primary server is 
subjected to a fault, one of the replicas takes over in a process that is transparent 
to the user. There are two basic ways this technique can be implemented. One, a 
proxy or gateway handles communication between the users and service. The 
proxy keeps track of the availability of the service and distributes the incoming 
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communications to all the nodes but allows only the communication from the 
active node to go out. When a fault occurs, it redirects traffic from the next active 
node. The other type in which there is no proxy, all the nodes receive the traffic 
and use it to update their states. However, it is only the active node that 
responds. When it fails, the next node takes over. In case of a proxy, there has to 
be a significant change to the Poly^2 architecture to accommodate another 
gateway in front of the services. In case of no proxy, it becomes the responsibility 
of the nodes internally to keep track of the active node. Also, to ensure that all 
the nodes receive the incoming data, the multicast has to be reliable. 
 For both forms of the technique, the communication costs will be high 
since the states are being kept perennially updated. Putting up either a proxy or 
making the multicast reliable will require a high engineering cost. In case an 
exploit occurs, it is replicated across the nodes and persists even if the initial 
active node fails and the new one takes over.  
This technique however, offers lower downtime. Since the next node is 
already active and in the current state of the service, it can take over seamlessly. 
Also, due to state persistence, when the active node fails, the data is preserved 
by all the nodes in the replication cluster. The storage required is limited to any 
write action carried out on the nodes. 
Hence, the high costs are associated with communications, engineering 
and exploitation persistence. Costs are mitigated in terms of loss of data, 




4.2. Analysis of the Checkpointing Paradigm 
 
The checkpointing paradigm ensures that service on restoration is always 
restored from a point at which the service was uncompromised. A checkpoint is 
maintained on which the image of the service is kept and if required updated. 
When a fault occurs, the service is restored from the stored checkpoint. The 
storage costs with regard to this are sufficiently high since a complete image will 
have to be kept to initiate a recovery. Since the checkpoint is not necessarily a 
reflection of the current state of the service, there may be a significant amount of 
data loss when the recovery from checkpoint is initiated. There may be a 
perceptible difference in time as the checkpointing showing a small but significant 
downtime. 
However, the communication costs would be low since the active node 
would not need to communicate with any other node. The checkpoint can be 
hosted as a virtual machine allowing restoration from an image. This decreases 
the engineering effort required to carry it out. Since, a checkpoint need only be 
carried out infrequently and then at the point of a fault, the processing overheads 
involved are low. Since the current state is not maintained and the checkpoint is 
restored from an uncompromised state, any exploitation on the service carried 
out in the current state does not persist post-recovery.  
Hence, the costs are associated in terms of storage, loss of data and 
downtime. Costs are mitigated in terms of communication, engineering effort, 
processing overheads and persistence of exploitations.  
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4.3. Analysis of the Hybrid Recovery System 
 
The hybrid system creates a two-tier recovery technique including aspects 
of both the active state replication as well as the checkpointing recovery system. 
It invokes the active state replication when there are faults that may not have 
been triggered by a malicious entity. In this case, one of the replicas would take 
over the function of the primary service, maintaining the state and ensuring that 
the process is transparent to the user.  However, in case of exploits caused by a 
malicious entity the service would be restored from a previous clean state 
ensuring that service being provided is uncompromised. In case of this 
technique, the average downtime would be lower since a checkpoint recovery 
would only be triggered in case of a malicious activity being triggered by a 
detection system. Also unlike the active replication system, the state would only 
be maintained in case of fault that has not been triggered by a malicious entity. 
This would ensure that the exploitation of vulnerabilities which may have been 
persistent over the replicas is not so. 
However, the costs incurred in this case would be the engineering efforts 
involved in setting up this technique as well as the cost of setting up an intrusion 
detection system to determine which faults may have been triggered by a 
malicious entity. Also involved would be the cost of implementing both the 
checkpointing recovery technique as well as the active state replication technique 
including the human effort involved. In spite of the costs involved, the critical 
services that fall within the purview of the Poly^2 framework would benefit greatly 
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from the hybrid technique. Availability of services often affects events such as 
loss of business and reputation that is significant for the actors involved.  
4.4. Conclusion 
 
From the above analysis, we can observe that there are a number of 
factors on which the costs can be obtained.  These costs and their possible 
mitigation can guide the reasoning for selecting a particular recovery technique. 
This, however, does not take into account the costs or benefits with regard to the 
adoption of the Poly^2 framework. This analysis was carried out with respect to 
services that are being run under the Poly^2 framework. 
With regard to costs of communications, it is seen to be high in case of 
active replication and low in case of checkpointing. It is high in case of active 
replication due to the communication required to maintain the state of the nodes. 
The same cost applies to the hybrid recovery technique as well. 
With regard to costs of storage, this cost is significantly high in case of the 
checkpointing technique due to the requirement to store the image of the service. 
This cost would apply to the hybrid recovery technique as well since the 
checkpoint technique is implemented as a part of the hybrid recovery technique. 
The active state replication has a high engineering cost as well as a 
possibly high cost due to the impact on the framework. The hybrid recovery 
technique also has the same cost associated. However, instead of using a proxy 
that could potentially increase the impact on the framework itself, the proxy-less 
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alternative is used. This cost is however; relatively low for the checkpointing 
technique where the service is hosted upon a virtual machine and restored from 
an uncompromised image upon the occurrence of a fault. The similar cost for the 
hybrid recovery mechanism is high since it is required to have both the functions 
of the checkpointing as well as the active replication technique. 
The cost occurring due to loss of data is high with the checkpointing 
technique. This is due to the fact that when it is initiated, the service is restored to 
a previous state and all the data in the interim is lost. This is mitigated with 
respect to the hybrid recovery technique. In this case, the checkpointing is 
initiated only when a malicious fault is thought to have occurred.  
The cost associated with downtime is significantly higher in checkpointing. 
This is mitigated in the hybrid recovery technique. This is again due to the fact 
that the checkpointing is initiated only in the specific circumstance of a malicious 
fault. Otherwise, the technique uses active replication to recover from a fault that 
has a lower cost associated with downtime. 
The cost associated with processing overheads is high with the active 
replication technique since it requires that the state be constantly upgraded 
across all nodes. This cost is reflected in the hybrid recovery as well. 
The persistence of exploitation is present in the active replication 
technique. However, it is significantly mitigated with the hybrid recovery 
technique. In case of malicious faults, the technique uses the checkpointing from 
a previously uncompromised state where the exploitations are no longer allowed 
to persist.  
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 With respect to the benefits, it is seen that the active replication technique 
has a lower time to recovery in comparison to the checkpointing technique. 
However for the hybrid recovery technique, it is seen that while time to recovery 
is low when it is functioning in the active replication form, it may increase when a 
malicious fault occurs and the checkpointing form is employed.  
 In case of the state preservation and continuity of the service, the hybrid 
recovery technique maintains the state in case of normal functioning, i.e. when 
no faults occur and when there are non-malicious faults. In case of the 
checkpointing technique, the current state is not preserved and on recovery, 
current connections and data may be lost. 
 In case of removal of exploits, when a malicious fault occurs, the hybrid 
recovery technique initiates the checkpointing that restores the service from an 
uncompromised image. However, an active replication technique replicates the 
exploit over all the nodes and when the current active node fails, the node to take 
over has the same exploit.  
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 Both the checkpointing and active replication respond to all incidents in 
the same manner. However, the hybrid recovery mechanism differentiates the 
response based on the input from the intrusion detection system. If a non-
malicious fault occurs, the active replication form is triggered. If a malicious fault 
is detected, the checkpointing technique is initiated. This ensures that while the 
state is preserved and normal functioning can be carried out in cases of non-
malicious faults but in case of malicious ones, the exploits are not allowed to 
remain persistent and all connections including potentially malicious ones are 
abandoned. 
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We see that the hybrid recovery technique shares the costs with regard to 
both the active replication as well as the checkpointing technique. However, it 
also mitigates the costs with respect to both leading to reduced loss of data and 
downtime (in comparison to checkpointing) and reduced persistence of exploits 
(in comparison to active replication). It also is able to provide a differentiated 
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response in case of both malicious and non-malicious faults and thus, providing 























CHAPTER 5. THE ARCHITECTURE 
To implement the technique, a two-tier architecture was implemented. To 
recover from non-malicious faults, it is considered valuable if the state is 
maintained. This means that the recovery would need to be such that loss in 
capacity is transparent to the service user. However for malicious faults, such a 
capacity may not be wholly in favour of the service. A state of being actively 
replicated may not be advisable in the case of a malicious fault. In such a case, it 
might be required that the connections be abandoned and restored to a 
previously uncompromised state.  Hence, it would be important that the 
potentially malicious connection is abandoned and the service restored. This is 
carried out by restoring the service from a backup in the form of an image. There 
is, however, another issue of detecting when a malicious fault occurs. For this 
purpose, we use an intrusion detection system (IDS) to generate the alerts 
whenever a potentially malicious activity occurs.  
To maintain the state in case of non-malicious faults, replicas of the 
service are kept whose states are kept consistent with that of the primary service. 
In the event of the failure of the primary service, one of the replicas may be able 
to take over in a process that is transparent to the user. Due to the maintenance 
of the state, current connections are not lost and neither is the data.  
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Next, the three main components of the architecture would be explored. 
The checkpointing system that provides recovery from malicious would be first 
explored. Then, the active state replication would be looked at. After that, the 
detection system that bridges these two recovery systems would be looked at. 
5.1. Checkpoint Recovery 
 
The recovery system suggested is similar to the one proposed by Laadan 
et al (2005). However, this system has significant changes to accommodate the 
requirements of the project including the limitations and the scope already stated. 
To carry out the checkpointing, another layer introduced between the host 
operating system and the service. The service itself is hosted on a virtual 
machine that is in turn hosted on the server. The servers used are of two kinds – 
Sun SunFire V60X and Dell PowerEdge 1850.  
The SunFire V60X has the host operating system as FreeBSD 8.0 running 





The Dell PowerEdge 1850 has the host operating system as FreeBSD 8.0 







The service itself is run on virtual machines on a Sun VirtualBox platform 
administered across the network by the Poly^2 security server. The running of 
the checkpointing technique is shown below. 
 
Figure 5.1 Checkpointing form 
 When the service is initialized, a image of it is created and kept. Assuming 
that initially image was not compromised, this image is kept as an 
uncompromised state. When the compromise of a service is detected, the current 
state of the service is abandoned and the service is restored from the 
uncompromised image. However, as a result of this all current connections are 
abandoned and any data that was in the current state is also. In case of the chat 
server implementation, this refers primarily to the chat history and the 
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connections to the clients. When the service is compromised and a recovery is 
carried out from a checkpoint, the connections as well as the chat history are 
lost. 
5.2. Active Replication 
 
The replication for maintaining the state of the application is carried out at 
an application level. For the purpose of the project, the application to be used for 
the purpose is chat server that has been replicated across two servers. This 
would be similar to the approach taken by Wang et al (2001). The application 
itself built upon the foundation provided by the JGroups API. JGroups is a toolkit 
for providing reliable multicast communication. This property is used to provide 
maintenance of state between the primary service and it’s replicas. Interactions 
take place between the client and the cluster hosting the services. The cluster is 
transparent to the user. Upon failure of the primary server, a replica takes over 
it’s functions in a manner that the previous sessions are carried over. Such a 
function while desirable in the case of a non-malicious failure, however, in case 
of the involvement of a malicious entity, the recovery would revert to the 






Figure 5.2 Active Replication form 
 The user interacts with the service in a manner that the active replication 
form is transparent to it. Whenever there is a communication from the user to the 
active node, all the nodes intercept it but the active node only sends the 
response. This ensures that the state (in this case, the chat history) is current 
across all the nodes. Whenever the current active node fails, the operation can 
be taken over by the next node. 
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5.3.  Detection 
 
There has to be a differentiation as to when of the above two techniques 
has to be used. While the active replication technique maintains the state of the 
service but the technique requires a higher overhead and also leads to 
persistence of any exploits that take place. The checkpoint technique ensures 
that the system is restored from a clean state, however, with significant loss of 
data and higher recovery time.  
To differentiate which of the two techniques should be employed 
according to the event, an intrusion detection system was employed. On 
detection of an event by the system, the checkpoint recovery is triggered. 
In case of this project, an intrusion detection system based on SNORT 
was employed. It was hosted upon a hardened system having a FreeBSD  8.0 
operating system. The hardware it was hosted upon was a Sun SunFire V60x. 
The intrusion detection system was placed in front of the primary gateway 
to and was made transparent to the services as well users accessing the 
services.  
5.4. Chapter Conclusion 
 
The architecture that has been enumerated is overlayed upon the Poly^2 
framework. It does not affect the original design of the Poly^2 framework but 
extends it. All services are still isolated from each other not only in their own 
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individual servers but in their individual clusters. Attacks taking place on a 
specific service are not only isolated to the particular service but the service itself 
is not completely lost as well with recovery mechanisms being in place. The 
complete framework is seen below. 
 Figure 5.3 Poly^2 with Availability 
The application clusters shown have the recovery mechanisms for the 
particular service. Each of the services is contained within a single cluster 
instead of a single server. The nodes in each cluster provide for the active 
replication while each node has the capacity to carry out a checkpoint recovery 
on direction from the security server. The security server also monitors the 
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intrusion detection system and upon receiving a alert, it instructs the nodes of 
attacked service to undergo checkpointing.  
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            





CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The recovery mechanisms that have been explored in this project add a 
novel extension to the Poly^2 framework. The original framework isolated each of 
the services into their own ‘cages’. A cage was their particular hardware and 
operating system allowing for their isolation to the outside attacks. The recovery 
mechanisms acted as an extension to this concept. Each of the service cages is 
extended to be a cluster to provide recovery to the service. 
The recovery mechanism suggested in this work is novel in the sense that 
it takes the advantages of two well-known mechanisms and applies them in a 
manner that mitigates their disadvantages. The active state replication ensures 
that in case of non-malicious faults, the user experiences only a minimal amount 
of disturbance. However, the checkpointing recovery system ensures that in case 
of malicious faults, the system recovers from it albeit with an increased amount of 
downtime and loss of data. 
This system is meant to be used under two conditions. The service has to 
be placed under the Poly^2 framework. The service also has to be such that it is 
expected to be attacked occasionally and not with a very high frequency. This 
was shown by the cost-benefit analysis where it was seen that a high occurrence 
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of the checkpointing form, which is employed in case of malicious faults, will lead 
to a higher cost in terms of downtime and loss of data. 
However, there are some issues that can be addressed. Currently, the 
recovery in the checkpoint mechanism takes place from a former, static version 
of the service. Whenever, the service is restored from an uncompromised image, 
it is still vulnerable to the same vulnerability that previously exploited the service. 
This can be improved by having a mechanism that on regular intervals updates 
the service image so that on recovery at some point, the service restored is a 
fixed version of the image.  
The intrusion detection system is a rule-based system that detects 
breaches based upon the ruleset upon which the system functions. However, if 
the breach is not detected by the intrusion detection system, it may lead to a fault 
that the system may believe to be non-malicious which will eventually lead to an 
incorrect part of the mechanism being initiated. A detection system that is more 
robust may improve the functioning of the overall system. 
The active replication part of the system is currently taking place at an 
application level. Improving this in a manner such that this takes place at a level 
independent of the application allowing this system to be generic for any 
application that would need to be placed within the framework.   
The recovery system though hybrid in nature can be improved by 
changing the very essence of it. The current system requires that the functions 
be differentiated on the basis of input received from the detection system. A 
unified recovery paradigm that can provide comprehensive recovery within the 
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paradigm of the Poly^2 framework would be an interesting improvement to the 
project.  
The Poly^2 framework is meant to protect an organization’s mission-
critical services. However, setting up such a framework for an organization can 
be an expensive undertaking. It would be an interesting exploration to look at an 
approach where the framework is  offered as a service where mission-critical 
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